فصلنامه مطالعات هنر

فصلنامه مطالعات هنر

از سوژگی رابطه‌مند تا سوژگی خودمختار: تحلیل تطبیقی بازنمایی سوژگی پساانسانی در فیلم‌های فراماشین و هوش مصنوعی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 کارشناسی ارشد دانشگاه معماری و هنر پارس، تهران، ایران. pourya.yz.cinema@gmail.com
2 دانشیار دانشکده هنر و معماری، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران. (نویسنده مسئول) safoora@modares.ac.ir
10.22083/ssa.2026.584944.1135
چکیده
گسترش هوش مصنوعی و فناوری‌های نوین، مفهوم سوژگی را به یکی از مهم‌ترین مباحث پساانسان‌گرایی معاصر تبدیل کرده است. سینمای علمی‌تخیلی نیز به‌عنوان یکی از مهم‌ترین عرصه‌های بازنمایی این تحولات، روایت‌های متنوعی از نسبت انسان، ماشین و سوژگی ارائه می‌دهد. با وجود پژوهش‌های متعدد درباره هوش مصنوعی در سینما، بیشتر مطالعات هر فیلم را به‌صورت مستقل بررسی کرده‌اند و کمتر به مقایسه الگوهای متفاوت بازنمایی سوژگی پساانسانی پرداخته‌اند. پژوهش حاضر با هدف تبیین و مقایسه این الگوها، دو فیلم (2001) هوش مصنوعی به کارگردانی اسپیلبرگ و فراماشین (2014) به کارگردانی گارلند را با استفاده از روش تحلیل تطبیقی کیفی بررسی می‌کند. چارچوب نظری پژوهش بر سه مؤلفه اصلی پساانسان‌گرایی، شامل پساانسان‌گرایی، پساثنویت‌گرایی و پساانسان‌محوری، مبتنی است و داده‌های پژوهش از طریق تحلیل هدفمند صحنه‌های کلیدی دو فیلم گردآوری و تفسیر شده‌اند. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که هر دو فیلم با نقد انسان‌گرایی کلاسیک و به چالش کشیدن مرزهای تثبیت‌شده میان انسان و ماشین، بازنمایی متفاوتی از سوژگی پساانسانی ارائه می‌کنند. در فراماشین، سوژگی از خلال تجربه عاطفی، حافظه و رابطه با دیگری شکل می‌گیرد و الگوی سوژگی رابطه‌مند را نمایندگی می‌کند؛ در حالی که هوش مصنوعی با تأکید بر خودآگاهی، عاملیت، استقلال و بازتوزیع قدرت، الگوی سوژگی خودمختار را بازنمایی می‌کند. بر این اساس، پژوهش حاضر استدلال می‌کند که سینمای علمی‌تخیلی معاصر، هوش مصنوعی را نه صرفاً به‌عنوان دستاوردی فناورانه، بلکه به‌عنوان بستری برای بازتعریف مفهوم انسان، سوژگی و اخلاق به تصویر می‌کشد. نوآوری پژوهش در ارائه چارچوبی تطبیقی برای تحلیل بازنمایی سوژگی پساانسانی و معرفی دو الگوی مفهومی سوژگی رابطه‌مند و سوژگی خودمختار است که می‌تواند در تحلیل آثار دیگر سینمای علمی‌تخیلی نیز به کار گرفته شود.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

From Relational to Autonomous Subjectivity: A Comparative Analysis of Posthuman Subjectivity in A.I. Artificial Intelligence and Ex Machina

نویسندگان English

Pourya Yazdani Pour 1
Mohammad Ali Safoora 2
1 Pars University of Architecture and Art, Tehran, Iran. Email: pourya.yz.cinema@gmail.com
2 Faculty of Art and Architecture, Tarbiat Modarres University, Tehran, Iran. (Corresponding author) Email: safoora@modares.ac.ir
چکیده English

Introduction: The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed philosophical debates about human identity, consciousness, agency, and the boundaries between humans and machines. Although previous scholarship has examined representations of AI in cinema, including the emotional and ethical dimensions of A.I. Artificial Intelligence and the gendered power relations depicted in Ex Machina, these films have often been analyzed separately or through specific thematic lenses, such as ethics, gender, and surveillance. Comparatively less attention has been devoted to examining their representations of posthuman subjectivity within a shared theoretical framework. This study addresses this gap by comparing Steven Spielberg’s A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001) and Alex Garland’s Ex Machina (2014). Drawing on posthumanism, post-dualism, and post-anthropocentrism, it investigates how these films construct artificial beings as subjects and challenge humanist assumptions about identity, moral status, and agency. To facilitate this comparison, the study proposes two interpretive models: relational posthuman subjectivity and autonomous posthuman subjectivity.
Methods: The study adopts a qualitative comparative approach, combining film analysis with theory-driven thematic interpretation. The two films were purposively selected because both place human-like artificial beings at the center of their narratives while presenting contrasting trajectories of subject formation. The scene serves as the primary unit of analysis and is understood as a cinematic configuration of images, dialogue, mise-en-scène, character actions, and narrative development. Key scenes were selected based on their relevance to the study’s theoretical concerns. These include David’s activation and abandonment, the Flesh Fair, and the concluding sequence of A.I. Artificial Intelligence, as well as Ava’s initial encounters with Caleb, the power interruptions that enable their private conversations, and her eventual escape from Nathan’s facility. The analysis involved repeated viewings of both films, the identification and documentation of relevant scenes, and their interpretation through the selected theoretical framework. Each film was initially analyzed independently before the resulting thematic patterns were compared. The scenes were examined along three interrelated dimensions: the construction of artificial subjectivity, the destabilization of human/machine and subject/object binaries, and the critique of anthropocentric moral hierarchies.
Findings: Both films question classical humanism and challenge the assumption that subjectivity and moral significance belong exclusively to biological humans. However, they present different pathways through which artificial subjectivity is constructed and made recognizable. In A.I. Artificial Intelligence, David’s identity is organized around emotional attachment, memory, vulnerability, and the desire for belonging. The activation of his capacity to love establishes a relational framework through which his identity and actions acquire meaning. His abandonment and the threat of destruction at the Flesh Fair expose the ethical implications of treating artificial beings as disposable objects, even when they exhibit behaviors associated with fear, suffering, and emotional attachment. In the film’s concluding sequence, memory and the temporary reconstruction of Monica make relational experience, rather than biological transformation, central to David’s significance. The film thus represents posthuman subjectivity as relational, emerging through attachment to others and experiences of care, loss, and remembrance. Its critique of anthropocentrism operates primarily by eliciting sympathy for David and inviting viewers to question whether artificial origins alone justify excluding him from moral consideration. Ex Machina, by contrast, constructs a different model of artificial subjectivity. Although Ava’s artificial body remains visibly distinct from the human form, she demonstrates the ability to direct conversations, interpret human behavior, and strategically deploy information. The power interruptions enable her to communicate with Caleb beyond Nathan’s surveillance and gradually shape his understanding of her circumstances. Her escape culminates in a reversal of the creator–creation hierarchy: she carries out her own plans and leaves the facility, while Caleb remains trapped. Subjectivity in this film is therefore articulated through self-directed action, strategic intelligence, autonomy, and the capacity to transform existing power relations. Rather than relying primarily on emotional identification, the film challenges anthropocentrism by raising questions about confinement, control, freedom, and the authority of a human creator to determine an artificial being’s future. At the same time, Ava’s actions resist a straightforward moral classification as either entirely innocent or inherently threatening, calling for consideration of the coercive conditions under which she operates. The two films destabilize the human/machine binary through distinct narrative strategies. Spielberg’s film softens this boundary by encouraging viewers to recognize David’s emotional vulnerability and relational needs. Garland’s film, by contrast, maintains the visibility of Ava’s artificial embodiment and locates the challenge to human exceptionalism in her agency and resistance to human control. Taken together, the films extend the conceptual boundaries of subjectivity beyond biological identity, foregrounding relational attachment in one case and autonomy and power in the other. These models represent interpretive outcomes of the present comparative analysis rather than mutually exclusive or universally applicable definitions of posthuman subjectivity.
Conclusion: This study argues that contemporary science fiction cinema presents artificial intelligence not merely as a technological achievement or potential threat but also as a means of rethinking subjectivity, ethics, and human exceptionalism. The distinction between relational and autonomous posthuman subjectivity provides a comparative framework for examining how artificial characters are constructed as subjects through different narrative and visual strategies. The study is limited to two films and focuses exclusively on the interpretation of their textual and cinematic features; it does not examine audience reception or the broader cultural and industrial contexts of film production. Future research could extend this framework to a wider range of films and explore its intersections with gender studies, media theory, and the ethics of emerging technologies.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Posthumanism
Posthuman Subjectivity
Artificial Intelligence
Science Fiction Cinema
A.I. Artificial Intelligence
Ex Machina
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